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I. INTRODUCTION
Fairness as well as public policy demand that compliance with the
comprehensive federal regulation of prescription drugs be conclusive
evidence that pharmaceutical manufacturers have discharged their
duty to provide the public with reasonably safe and effective products
and appropriate warnings.' To subject companies to state tort and
contract suits after they have complied with federal requirements is
patently unfair. The United States Food and Drug Administration's
("FDA") requirements govern nearly every aspect of the testing,2 de-
sign,3 manufacture, 4 labeling5 and distribution of prescription drugs,6
as a general matter detailing specific duties with respect to which man-
ufacturers are not permitted to deviate. Notwithstanding a pharma-
ceutical manufacturer's faithful compliance with this detailed
1. See infra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing public policy interest in limiting a com-
pany's liability when it has complied with federal regulations).
2. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (1994).
3. Id. § 355(b)(1)(C).
4. Id. § 355(b)(1)(D).
5. Id. § 355(b)(1)(F).
6. See 21 U.S.C. § 360(a)(1)(1994) (noting that "manufacturing" and "processing," governed
by 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(D), includes distribution).
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regulatory scheme, a sympathetic jury asked to judge the faceless
"deep pocket" company, in light of an adverse effect suffered by a
particular patient, frequently finds, after the fact, that the company
should have performed some additional test or included some other
warning and therefore finds the manufacturer negligent, or its product
defective, under state law.
Allowing retrospective jury nullification of the FDA's considered
regulation on which manufacturers have relied is not only fundamen-
tally unfair but is contrary to public policy.7 The FDA's approval of a
product for sale under particular labeling represents a deliberate bal-
ancing by the FDA of the public health benefits and risks of the prod-
uct and constitutes a determination that marketing it under the
approved label strikes the optimal balance. Moreover, second-guess-
ing by individual juries subjects manufacturers to the impossible task
of tailoring their complex products and product descriptions to fifty-
plus different jurisdictions - a task that, in all likelihood, interferes
with the provision of such products in interstate commerce. The asso-
ciated costs - including litigation costs - inevitably are passed on to
consumers, making the already costly pharmaceutical more expensive
for all and unavailable for some.
The core of the current federal legislative scheme regulating phar-
maceutical and medical devices, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
("FDC Act"),8 was enacted in 1938 - years before the explosion of
state tort litigation that began in the 1970s. Since it was not an issue at
that time, the original FDC Act was silent as to whether states could
allow individuals to prevail against companies on state-based tort (or
related warranty-based) theories even when a company had complied
with federal standards.
Not surprisingly, when Congress completely reworked the medical
devices portion of the FDC Act in 1976 when it passed the Medical
Devices Amendments ("MDA"), 9 it included an explicit preemption
provision prohibiting states from imposing upon medical device man-
ufacturers any legal requirements that are "different from, or in addi-
tion to" those mandated by federal law. 10 The legislative history
7. See infra text accompanying note 11.
8. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (1994).
9. 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k (1994).
10. The relevant section, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a), provides:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political subdivision of
a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended for human
use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable
under this chapter to the device, and
1996]
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explained that the above-mentioned public policy concerns were the
basis for the provision." Thus, since 1976 there has been virtually no
question -that manufacturers of so-called "class III" medical devices
cannot be held liable under state tort and implied warranty claims if
the manufacturers have complied with related federal requirements.
Indeed, courts have construed the provision as providing nearly blan-
ket preemption of state law touching on class III medical devices.' 2
However, Congress did not amend the pharmaceutical portion of
the FDC Act in 1976. As a result, there remains no explicit Congres-
sional statement as to whether states can impose on pharmaceutical
manufacturers, through tort and warranty law, legal requirements that
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
Id.
It is well-established that this provision preempts both state legislative and common law. See
Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 16-18 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that the MDA preempt a
plaintiff's state and common law claims; Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp., 22 F.3d 540, 542-43 (3d
Cir.), cert denied, 115 S. Ct. 429 (1994) (holding that state law tort claims are preempted under
the MDA, which prohibit states from establishing or continuing any requirements different from
or in addition to federal requirements); see generally San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon,
359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) (awarding damages pursuant to state law is "regulatory" in effect and
therefore subject to preemption).
11. See H.R. REP. No. 853, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45-46 (1976) ("The Committee recognizes
that if a substantial number of differing requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed
by jurisdictions other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly
burdened.").
12. There is a "consistent line of developing authority" of blanket preemption of tort claims
arising from so-called "class III" medical devices which receive pre-market approval from the
FDA for sale under particular labeling under the MDA's preemption provision. Ministry of
Health v. Shiley, 858 F. Supp. 1426, 1429 (C.D. Cal. 1994) (referring to a developing line of cases
which holds that state law is preempted under federal law); see, e.g., King v. Collagen, 983 F.2d
1130, 1134 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993) (finding preemption and discussing the
specific requirements set out by the FDA on Zyderm, a class III device, in regard to labeling,
designing, and manufacturing); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416, 1422 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 114 S. Ct. 86 (1993) (noting that the class III Product Approval Process ("PMA") process
constitutes a specific requirement applicable to a particular device under the Act and finding
preemption). At least one recent case has provided a basis for extending preemption to all
classes of devices. See Mendes, 18 F.3d at 17-19 (finding preemption on the basis of FDA good
manufacturing practice standards, which are applicable to all medical devices). Courts have
gone so far as to find that the MDA preempts claims that companies fraudulently obtained FDA
approval by supplying false or misleading information to FDA. See Reeves v. Acromed Corp.,
44 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 1995) (noting the MDA preemption of "a failure to warn" claim
against manufacturers of metal bone implants where information on the manufacturer's applica-
tion to the FDA was inaccurate); Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316, 1329 (3rd Cir. 1995)
(holding that the MDA preempt plaintiff's cause of action where defendant made false represen-
tations to the FDA to obtain pre-market approval); Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 27-28
(1st Cir. 1995) (discussing the absence of a fraud exception to the preemption provision of the
MDA). But see Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1458 (9th Cir. 1995) (interpreting the
MDA's preemption provision narrowly).
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differ from the FDA's manufacturing, marketing and labeling
requirements.
Since Congress did not rule out the possibility that the MDA's pre-
emption provision merely clarified existing law, and given the fact that
the same policies discussed in the MDA's legislative history are
equally applicable to finding preemption with respect to pharmaceuti-
cals, there is a strong argument that the FDC Act impliedly preempts
state laws with respect to pharmaceuticals. After some early cases
found implied preemption, however, the vast majority of courts that
have subsequently examined the question have decided against im-
plied preemption. 13 Part II of this Article surveys this case law and
identifies recurring flaws in the court opinions. After correcting these
notable misconceptions, and showing why the issue of implied pre-
emption should therefore not be viewed as a settled legal question,
Part II argues that under a well-considered application of established
preemption principles, state law should be impliedly preempted under
the FDC Act.
Notwithstanding the strong reasons for implied preemption, it may
be difficult to lead some courts to revisit a question they perceive to
be settled. 14 Part III, therefore, introduces and analyzes three hereto-
fore unexplored alternatives to preemption that may be capable of
accomplishing much the same effect of securing uniform legal duties
for manufacturers of pharmaceuticals.
Subsection A of Part III examines the option of imposing federal
common law negligence and strict liability standards equivalent to
FDA standards in otherwise state law-based product liability claims.
Displacing a single element of a state cause of action with a federal
standard would be less disruptive of state law than preempting the
entire state cause of action. Due to this and other differences between
preemption and federal common law, a court that would be unwilling
to preempt a state cause of action may very well be willing to modify
it under federal common law. 15 Subsection B of Part III explores a
second alternative to preemption, under which compliance with FDA
standards would be held to satisfy state tort (or contract based) stan-
dards as a matter of state law. This approach accords with well-settled
legal principles codified in the Restatement (Second) of Torts as well as
13. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 28-33.
15. See infra note 182.
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the most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts and already
has been relied upon by the highest courts in several states.16
Subsection C of Part III examines several possible legislative solu-
tions at both the federal and state levels. Discussed are two possible
federal solutions: an explicit preemption provision akin to that found
in the Medical Devices Amendments and a compensation system
modeled on the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Act ("NCVI
Act"). 17 Subsection C also surveys several state statutes that limit or
altogether eliminate manufacturers' liability where the companies
have complied with federal standards.
II. IMPLIED PREEMPTION OF STATE TORT CLAIMS WITH RESPECT
TO PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
The section of the FDC Act governing prescription drugs, 18 which
largely dates back to 1938, more than thirty years before the tort
revolution, does not have an explicit preemption provision. State tort
and warranty claims will be preempted under the FDC Act, therefore,
only if it can be shown that Congress impliedly intended to preempt
such state law actions.
The first subsection will present an overview of the doctrine of im-
plied preemption. Because implied preemption in a particular field is
integrally tied to the nature and scope of federal regulation in that
field, the second subsection of this part will explore in detail the statu-
tory and regulatory scheme governing pharmaceuticals. The third
subsection will point out the flawed reasoning that has been used in
the cases that have rejected preemption arguments in the context of
prescription drugs. The fourth subsection will articulate the affirma-
tive argument why state law should be found to be preempted by the
FDC Act.
A. The Doctrine of Implied Preemption
Preemption refers to the wholesale displacement by federal law of
state law claims in a particular field of law. 19 Preemption is found
16. See infra note 193 (discussing that compliance with FDA regulations establishes compli-
ance with state tort or contract law standards) and note 198 (discussing FDA standards as guide-
lines for compliance).
17. See Part II.C.1 (discussing two federal legislative solutions to the question of implied
preemption).
18. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-366 (1994).
19. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992) (indicating that preemp-




where Congress has indicated an intent to preempt.20 Congress' in-
tent may be "explicitly stated in the statute's language or implicitly
contained in its structure and purpose."' 21 The source for Congress'
preemption power, of course, is the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, Article IV, clause 2, which "invalidates state laws
that 'interfere with, or are contrary to' federal law."' 22 Preemption can
apply to state common law, as well as to state statutes and
regulations.23
As stated above, implied preemption is solely a matter of ascertain-
ing whether, as an objective matter, Congress intended to preempt
state law.24 Under the case law, implied preemption will be found
where one (or more) of three conditions are satisfied. First, preemp-
tion will be implied where state law actually conflicts with federal
law.25 Second, implied preemption will be found where federal law so
thoroughly occupies a legislative field " 'as to make reasonable the
inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it.' ",26 Finally, preemption will be implied whenever the federal inter-
est is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude
enforcement of state laws on the same subject.27
To establish that Congress implicitly intended to preempt state law
claims in connection with prescription drugs several presumptions
against implied preemption must be overcome. First is the presump-
tion that when Congress does not expressly state its intent, there is a
presumption against preemption. 28 The presumption is even stronger
when state or local regulation of matters related to health and safety is
involved.29 Further, courts are more reluctant to infer preemption
20. See id. ("The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of preemption analysis.")
(internal quotation omitted).
21. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
22. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 712 (1985).
23. See Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 325-26 (1981)
(ruling that the interstate commerce clause preempts both Iowa statutes and Iowa common law).
24. See Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2617; see also Jones, 430 U.S. at 525 (noting that Congress'
intent may be inferred from a statute's "structure and purpose").
25. See Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,239 (1967) (invalidating state unemploy-
ment compensation law insofar as it denies benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely be-
cause they file unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB).
26. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Conservation & Development Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 204 (1983) (quoting Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153 (1982)) (finding implied preemption under
the Home Owner's Loan Act).27. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62 (1941) (inferring intent to preempt from the
dominance of the federal interest in foreign affairs because "the supremacy of the national
power in the general field of foreign affairs ... is made clear by the Constitution").
28. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981) (stating that the basic assumption under
the Supremacy Clause is that Congress did not intend to displace state law).
29. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 715 (1985).
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from the comprehensiveness of regulations alone than from the com-
prehensiveness of statutes.30 Moreover, when preemption by regula-
tion is considered, courts are reluctant to find preemption by federal
regulations when the agency does not make very clear an intent to
preempt, since agencies normally address problems in a detailed man-
ner.31 Finally, the presumption against preemption is even stronger
when preemption would leave injured parties without a remedy.32
The relationship between the three doctrinal bases for finding im-
plied preemption, on the one hand, and the various presumptions
against implied preemption, on the other hand, has not been estab-
lished by the case law. No court opinions have attempted to con-
struct, much less succeeded in constructing, a general analytic
framework explaining what types of evidence or factors would be ade-
quate to overcome the presumptions against implied preemption. In-
stead, courts have tended merely to identify the above-listed tests for
finding implied preemption, enumerate the several presumptions
against it, and then delphically pronounce a conclusion of no preemp-
tion.33 In the end, implied preemption often seems to be largely a
matter of judicial fiat.
B. The Federal Statutory And Regulatory Framework
Since the three doctrinal bases for implied preemption turn on the
specific characteristics of the statutory and regulatory scheme at issue,
it is necessary to explore in some detail the legal regime created by the
FDC Act. In addition, because - as discussed below - much of the
case law addressing preemption in the prescription drug field deals
with a particular subset of such drugs, namely vaccines, it is also nec-
essary to describe the legal regime relating to that subset because pre-
scription drugs, in particular, and vaccines, in general, are not
governed by identical statutory schemes. While prescription drugs are
30. Id. at 717.
31. Id. at 718.
32. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251 (ruling no preemption of state tort
claims under the Atomic Energy Act where injured persons would have been left without rem-
edy); Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908
(1988) (noting the presumption against preemption in tort recoveries where no federal remedy
exists).
33. See, e.g., Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1112 (finding no preemption merely on the basis that there are
several presumptions against preemption).
[Vol. 45:395
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regulated solely by the FDC Act,34 vaccines are governed not only by
the FDC Act but also the NCVI Act. 35
1. The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
The FDC Act and regulations thereunder36 govern nearly every as-
pect of the testing, design, manufacture, labeling and distribution of
prescription drugs. It has been estimated that it takes between seven
and thirteen years to discover, develop, test, and gain final FDA mar-
keting approval of a new drug, four to six years of which is devoted to
clinical research to determine safety and efficacy, pursuant to FDA
requirements. 37 The Office of Technology Assessment concluded that
it takes $194 million to bring a new drug to market, after taking into
account tax deductions for research and development. 38
Under the FDC Act, no new drug may even be marketed unless it
receives FDA approval.39 The manufacturer initiates FDA review by
submitting an Investigational New Drug Application ("IND"), which
must contain information about the drug's chemistry, manufacturing,
pharmacology, and toxicology on the basis of animal and in vitro stud-
ies.4 0 Only after the FDA approves the IND may the drug's sponsor
then gather the data on clinical safety and efficacy (i.e., safety and
34. Although non-prescription, or "over-the-counter," drugs are also subject to the FDC Act,
this Article does not attempt to examine the applicability of preemption to such drugs. Nor does
this Article address the applicability of preemption to so-called "grandfathered drugs," that is,
drugs marketed prior to the effective date of the FDC Act that were exempted from the statu-
tory definition of "new drug" and corresponding regulatory requirements. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 321(p)(1) (defining the term "new drug"); see generally J. O'REILLY, FOOD AND DRUG AD-
MINISTRATION § 13.06 (1991) (discussing grandfathered drugs).
35. See Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755-3784 (1986) (establishing that vaccines are governed by
the NCVI Act). For the purposes of the FDC Act, "drugs" are defined in 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)
and specifically include "articles intended for use in the ... prevention of disease in man," e.g.,
vaccines. 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1) (emphasis supplied). The NCVI Act, however, provides a statu-
tory framework applicable only to the vaccines enumerated in 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14.
36. The FDC Act specifies that the approval must be by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services. Under 21 C.F.R. § 5.10(a)(1) (1994), the Secretary's authority under the FDC Act has
been delegated to the Commissioner of the FDA. All further references in the text will there-
fore be to the FDA rather than the Secretary.
37. Paul H. Sunshine, The Preemptive Scope of the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, 50
FOOD DRUG L.J. 191, 207-08 (1995) (citing HousE COMM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH AND TECH-
NOLOGY, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON Ti FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S PROCESS
FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS (Comm. Print 1980)).
38. Id. at 208 (citing George Anders, Vital Statistics: Disputed Cost of Creating a Drug, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 9, 1993, at B1, B5).
39. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1994).
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (1994) (listing the required contents of an IND application, nec-
essary for FDA approval of a new drug); 21 C.F.R. § 312.23 (1995) (stating the content require-
ments for an IND application).
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effectiveness in human use) required by the application for marketing
approval, the New Drug Application ("NDA"). 41
When eventually submitted for approval, the NDA by statute must
include detailed reports of all animal studies and clinical testing done
with the drug, reports of any adverse reactions, and any other perti-
nent information from the world-wide scientific literature. 42 The
NDA also must contain "full reports of investigations which have
been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and
whether such drug is effective in use," 43 and "specimens of the label-
ing proposed to be used for such drug." 44
Moreover, the FDA has promulgated under these statutory provi-
sions voluminous regulations that detail what a drug manufacturer
must include in its NDA.45 The application must contain all con-
trolled and uncontrolled studies relating to the drug,46 "an integrated
summary of all available information about the safety of the drug
product," 47 and generally "[a] description and analysis of any other
data or information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effec-
tiveness of the drug product obtained ... from any source foreign or
domestic. '48 Most important, the NDA must include "[ain integrated
summary of the benefits and risks of the drug, including a discussion
of why the benefits exceed the risks under the conditions stated in the
labeling., 49
Various provisions of the FDC Act and regulations also detail label-
ing requirements for prescription drugs. 50 FDA's approval of the la-
beling is a prerequisite to its approval of the NDA.5 1 The general
requirements for the labeling of an FDA-regulated drug are that it
"contain a summary of the essential scientific information needed for
the safe and effective use of the drug, '52 "be informative and accurate
41. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.54 (1995) (discussing the requirement of obtaining an approved inves-
tigational new drug application prior to submitting an NDA for approval).
42. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (stating that reports of investigations indicating whether a drug
is safe for use must be included in the application).
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See generally 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1995) (listing the content and format requirements of an
NDA application).
46. Id. § 314.50(d)(5)(ii)-(iii).
47. Id. § 314.50(d)(5)(vi)(a).
48. Id. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv).
49. Id. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii).
50. See generally, 21 U.S.C. § 355(a), (b)(1)(F) (noting FDA labeling requirements); see also
21 C.F.R. § 201.50-201.57 (1994) (listing the labeling requirements for prescription drugs).
51. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(F) (noting that labeling information must be submitted on a
NDA).
52. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a).
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and neither promotional in tone nor false or misleading in any particu-
lar,"'53 and "be based whenever possible on data derived from human
experience. a54 Moreover, the labeling must address certain specific
topics in a specific order, including "Indications and Usage," "Warn-
ings," "Precautions," and "Adverse Reactions. '5 5 The language of the
label is subject to FDA approval and, once approved, cannot perma-
nently be changed without FDA approval. 56
Once an NDA is approved, the manufacturer thereafter has a con-
tinuing duty to "promptly review all adverse drug experience informa-
tion obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any source,
foreign or domestic," and to promptly report such adverse drug exper-
iences to the FDA.57 In addition, the manufacturer must submit to
the FDA an annual report that includes the current labeling for the
drug,58 copies of all published and unpublished clinical trials of the
drug,59 and a "summary of significant new information from the pre-
vious year that might affect the safety, effectiveness or labeling of the
drug product. '60
53. Id. § 201.56(b).
54. Id. § 201.56(c).
55. Id. § 201.56(d)(1).
56. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12 (1995). Drug manufacturers have a limited right under FDA regula-
tions to implement stronger warnings without awaiting the FDA's approval of the new language,
but only where there is new evidence warranting a new or stronger warning. 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(c) (1995). Simultaneously with implementing the new language, however, the company
must seek FDA approval of it. Id. Further, the company's right to change the label's language
lasts only until the FDA acts on the manufacturer's request for approval of the change. Id.
Thus, as noted in the text, no permanent changes to the label may be made without FDA ap-
proval. Id.
57. 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(b)-(c) (1995) (emphasis added). An "adverse drug experience" is de-
fined as "any adverse event associated with the use of a drug in humans, whether or not consid-
ered drug related." Id. § 314.80(a) (emphasis added). Any adverse drug experience that is both
"serious" and "unexpected," or shows a significant increase in frequency, must be reported to
FDA within 15 working days. Id. § 314.80(c)(l)(i)-(ii). Other reactions are to be reported quar-
terly for the first three years after approval of the NDA and annually thereafter. Id.
§ 314.80(c)(2).
58. 21 C.F.R. § 314.81(b)(2)(iii).
59. Id. § 314.80(b)(2)(vi)(a)-(b).
60. Id. § 314.81(b)(2)(i). Further, approval of an NDA is subject to withdrawal at all times
based upon the current state of medical knowledge. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). Indeed, the FDA is
expressly required, "after due notice and opportunity for hearing" to the manufacturer, to with-
draw approval of the NDA upon finding that the drug no longer appears to be safe or have
substantial evidence of effectiveness under the conditions of use described in the labeling. Id.
The FDC Act also permits the FDA, in its discretion, to withdraw approval of the drug upon
finding that its labeling is false or misleading in any particular and has not been corrected after
reasonable notice, or that the manufacturer has repeatedly failed to make required reports. Id.
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Notably, these detailed requirements are nearly identical to the in-
formation required of manufacturers of class III medical devices, 61 a
context where federal regulation does, by express legislative provi-
sion, preempt state law.
2. The National Childhood Vaccination Injury Act
The NCVI Act outlines a dual remedial system for persons who sus-
tain vaccine-related injuries.62 The NCVI Act establishes a no-fault
fund from which injured persons may recover compensation.63 Addi-
tionally, the NCVI Act specifically provides that the traditional state
tort remedies are still available with respect to "avoidable" injuries64
61. Class III is the category for medical devices the safety of which, by FDA determination,
cannot be adequately assured through the combination of so-called general controls applicable
to all devices and "special controls" such as performance specifications provided for that general
type of device. Class III devices are therefore subject to both a requirement of FDA approval
PMA and to post-approval regulation to keep the FDA informed of developing information on
the device. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c(a)(1)(C) (requiring PMA for any device which cannot be
classified as class I or II because of insufficient information and is to used for the sustaining of
human life or presents a potential unreasonable risk of injury). Section 360e(e) requires the
Secretary to withdraw approval of an application upon new information about the safety device
or upon finding a deficiency in the application. Section 360i(a) requires producers of a device to
maintain records and make reports to the Secretary to assure that the device is not altered or
misbranded and to assure its safety and effectiveness.
The extensive PMA procedure for a class III device requires that the manufacturer submit to
the FDA detailed information on the device's design, components, properties and the principles
of its operation; its manufacture, processing, packaging and installation; its performance stan-
dards, if any; samples of the device; samples of the proposed labeling; and any other information
deemed relevant by the FDA. 21 U.S.C. § 360e; 21 C.F.R. § 814.20. Each PMA application is
referred by the FDA to a panel of experts, 21 U.S.C. § 360e(c)(2), and the FDA may either
approve the device for sale or return the application for additional information or testing. 21
U.S.C. § 360e(d). Approval is granted if the FDA finds that there is a "reasonable assurance"
that the device is "safe and effective ... with respect to the condition of use prescribed, recom-
mended or suggested in the labeling of the device," "weighing any probable benefit to health
from [the use of] the device against any probable risk of injury or illness from such use." 21
U.S.C. § 360c(a)(2); 21 C.F.R. § 860.7(c)(1).
Once the device has been approved for sale, the manufacturer must maintain certain records
and report to the FDA regarding the device, where the manufacturer "becomes aware of infor-
mation that reasonably suggests" that one of its devices "caused or contributed to a death or
serious injury," or malfunctioned in such a way likely to cause the same. 21 U.S.C. § 360i. Man-
ufacturers also are required to report other specified "significant adverse device experiences."
Id.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-11-15 (1994).
63. Id. Compensation for a vaccine-related injury or death is made from the Vaccine Injury
Compensation Trust Fund established under Section 9510 of Title 28. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(i)
(1994).
64. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (providing that "[n]o vaccine manufacturer shall be liable in a
civil action for damages arising from a vaccine-related injury or death associated with the admin-
istration of a vaccine ... if the injury or death resulted from side effects that were unavoidable
even though the vaccine was properly prepared and was accompanied by proper directions and
warnings").
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and where a vaccine manufacturer does not comply in all material re-
spects with the requirements under the FDC Act.65 In such cases, in-
jured parties may elect either to receive the no-fault compensation or
to pursue a state law tort action.66
Unlike the portion of the FDC Act governing drugs,67 the NCVI
Act - which Congress enacted in 1986 after the product liability ex-
plosion of the 1970s6 8 - does contain a preemption provision, albeit
an unusual one. It states that "[n]o State may establish or enforce a
law which prohibits an individual from bringing a civil action against a
vaccine manufacturer for damages for a vaccine-related injury or
death if such civil action is not barred by this part. '69 Thus, the NCVI
Act and its preemption provision actually operate in precisely the op-
posite manner as most other preemptive statutes. That is, with respect
to those circumstances where a cause of action may exist for the in-
jured vaccine user,70 the effect of the NCVI Act's express preemption
provision is to prohibit states from eliminating the applicability of
their own tort and contract laws vis-a-vis victims of vaccines. 71 In
other words, rather than prohibiting state law, the NCVI Act's pre-
emption provision appears to require that state law continue to be ap-
plicable to injured vaccine users.72
C. Limitations of the Case Law Rejecting Implied Preemption of
Claims Involving Prescription Drugs
1. Overview of the Case Law
The track record of advocates for implied preemption of state law
claims involving prescription drugs at first glance appears to be quite
65. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) ("State law shall apply to a civil action brought for damages
for a vaccine-related injury or death."). An exception provides that there shall be no liability for
"unavoidable" injuries if the manufacturer shows that it complied in all materials respects with
all requirements under the FDC Act. Id. § 300aa-22(b).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21.
67. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-366 (1994).
68. Indeed, the NCVI Act's legislative history explicitly states that the Act was intended to
stem the tide of state tort actions, which were deterring companies from developing and manu-
facturing vaccines. H.R. REP. No. 908, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(e).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) (stating that "[e]xcept as [otherwise provided] State law shall
apply to a civil action brought for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death").
71. See, e.g., Stewart v. International Playtex, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 907 (D.S.C. 1987) (ruling that
state law that attempts to regulate matters already addressed by the FDA is preempted by regu-
lations promulgated by the FDA).
72. Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is an intriguing question as to whether Con-
gress has the power to require states to retain state laws that are not constitutionally mandated.
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weak.73 Only one federal appellate court has ruled that the FDA's
regulation of drug labeling preempts state tort liability for failure to
warn.74 At least two federal district courts have ruled more generally
that a variety of state tort and contract claims were preempted under
the FDC Act, but both have been subsequently limited or overruled. 75
It appears that all other courts before which the question has been
brought have concluded that state tort and contract claims have not
been impliedly preempted under the FDC Act.76 Four circuits have
decided the question, holding that state tort claims are not preempted
by the FDC Act.77 Numerous lower federal and state courts also have
confronted the question and ruled against preemption. 78 Moreover,
73. See infra note 75 (noting federal circuit courts that have overruled district courts rulings of
preemption).
74. See Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1988) ("It would be patently
inconsistent [with the FDC Act] for a state ... to hold the manufacturer liable for including [the]
precise warning [approved by the FDA] when the manufacturer would otherwise be liable for
not including it.").
Further, in one recent case that addressed preemption in passing, a federal district court held
that the FDA's labeling regulations "control the nature of [the company's] duty to warn" and
concluded that state law to the contrary would be "preempted." See Walls v. Armour Pharma-
ceutical Co., 832 F. Supp. 1505, 1511-12 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (rejecting defendant's assertion that
court had mistakenly instructed the jury on the basis of federal law and had refused to instruct
the jury that only a known or reasonably foreseeable risk triggered a manufacturer's duty to
warn, reasoning that the duty to warn was governed by federal labeling requirements, not the
common law).
75. See Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1173. The Hurley Appellate Court overruled the District Court's
ruling for preemption claiming that "to date, the great majority of United States District Courts
... have ruled against preemption." Id. at 1176. The court claimed that neither the FDC Act
nor the Public Health Services Act explicitly preempts state law and the court should be hesitant
to find implied preemption. Id.; see also Abbot v. American Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988) (holding that federal law did not preempt a common-law action
for defective design or failure to warn).
76. See infra notes 77-80 (discussing the preemption status of federal law).
77. See Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1108 (finding no preemption for state defective design or failure to
warn claims); Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1173 (indicating defective design claims not preempted); Tobin
v. Astra Pharmaceutical Prods., Inc., 993 F.2d 528 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304 (1993)
(rejecting the argument that FDA approval preempts State product liability claims based on
design defects); Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 906 F.2d 1399 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 981
(1990) (holding that preemption did not apply).
78. See e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (finding that plaintiff who
suffered tooth discoloration after taking a tetracycline drug could pursue a state law cause of
action against the manufacturer of the drug because state law actions are not preempted by
federal regulation of the drug industry); Jones ex rel. Jones v. Lederle Labs., 695 F. Supp. 700
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (ruling claim of baby that suffered from permanent neurological damage from
the administration of the pertussis vaccine was not preempted by federal law); Foyle ex rel.
McMillan v. Lederle Labs., 674 F. Supp. 530 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (finding parents action for injuries
suffered by child as a result of the DPT vaccine was not preempted by federal law); Wack v.
Lederle Labs., 666 F. Supp. 123 (N.D. Ohio 1987) (ruling that products liability suit against
manufacturer of DPT vaccine was not impliedly preempted by the Public Health Service Act or
the Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act); MacGillivray v. Lederle Labs., 667 F. Supp. 743 (D.N.M.
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courts have begun to treat the issue of preemption as if the question is
well-settled, merely citing to other courts' opinions without undertak-
ing independent analysis. 79
2. Limitations of the Case Law
Notwithstanding the apparently strong negative case law to date, it
still may be possible to convince courts to displace state law via pre-
emption. A considered analysis reveals strong arguments both that
permitting state tort law recovery directly conflicts with the policies
undergirding the FDC Act, and that the comprehensive FDC Act oc-
cupies the field of drug regulation.80 Moreover, the recent strong
trend in favor of preemption in the closely analogous medical devices
area,81 which admittedly benefits from a more recent statute that in-
cludes an express preemption provision, may be helpful in persuading
courts to examine the issue in the pharmaceutical context.
Before articulating these arguments more fully, it is useful first to
examine more closely why the preemption efforts up to this point
have been largely unsuccessful. Answering this question immediately
reveals a variety of shortcomings of the seemingly decisive case law.
a. Ignoring the Vaccine/Drug Distinction
A major reason why preemption claims to date have not succeeded
is that the first preemption claims were (and indeed the vast majority
of all preemption claims litigated to date have been) asserted in the
context of vaccines. 82 Implied preemption is a hopeless straw man
1987) (ruling comprehensive federal regulation did not preempt the strict products liability claim
of a child vaccinated with the pertussis vaccine against its manufacturer); Morris v. Parke, Davis
& Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (holding products liability suit for damages suffered
from the administration of the DPT vaccine was not preempted by federal law); Knudsen v.
Connaught Labs., 691 F. Supp. 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1987) (holding that a wrongful death suit against
manufacturer of DPT vaccine was not preempted by federal law).
79. See Tobin, 993 F.2d at 537-38 ("[Tjhe great majority of United States district courts which
have addressed this issue have ruled against preemption") (citing Hurley, 863 F.2d at 1173).
80. Although not examined further in this Article, state law also may be preempted on the
basis of a dominant federal interest. After all, at issue is not state regulation of intra-state medi-
cal practice but of manufacturing and marketing activities that are almost always interstate in
character, that are heavily regulated under federal law, and with respect to which uniform stan-
dards are important. This raises the intriguing question of the appropriate role of state products
liability law with respect to nationally marketed goods that are regulated by the federal
government.
81. See infra note 188 and accompanying text (discussing the trend towards preemption in the
medical devices area).
82. See, e.g., Hurley, 851 F.2d at 1536 (involving a products liability action against manufac-
turer of the DPT vaccine after an infant suffered adverse effects to the vaccine); Abbot v. Ameri-
can Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 908 (1988) (involving products
liability action against manufacturer of diphtheria-tetanus pertussis vaccine after a child suffered
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under the NCVI Act, given the fact that the statute explicitly states
that state law is not preempted with respect to avoidable injuries and
where the manufacturer has not complied with FDA standards. 83
Courts have cited to this and related statutory language in concluding
that state law concerning vaccines has not been preempted.84
Courts that subsequently addressed preemption with respect to pre-
scription drugs have ignored the fact that there is no statute parallel to
the NCVI Act dealing with drugs that explicitly makes state law appli-
cable under discrete circumstances.8 5 By failing to distinguish drugs
from vaccines, courts have simply imported preemption conclusions
concerning vaccines into the prescription drug context.86
A more appropriate approach for the courts, therefore, would be to
distinguish drugs from vaccines on the basis that each is governed by a
different statutory scheme. Under this approach, most jurisdictions in
fact can be said to have no governing law regarding drug preemption,
and the few that do have relied on inapposite (i.e., vaccine-related)
authority.
b. Inapplicability of Various Presumptions Against Preemption
A second culprit behind the failed preemption claims in the case
law is the variety of presumptions against preemption mentioned
above. Each of those presumptions has been invoked by courts to
deny preemption claims in the pharmaceutical context that were
based on strong arguments under the established tests for implied pre-
emption. 87 For example, in Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co.,88 the
Fourth Circuit alluded to the plausibility of concluding that there has
been federal occupation of the field of drug regulation, acknowledging
that the "FDA's regulation of prescription drugs and biological prod-
ucts is comprehensive .... encompass[ing] the licensing, production,
neurological damage from the vaccine); Patten v. Lederle Labs., 655 F. Supp. 745 (D. Utah 1987)
(involving a wrongful death action brought by parents against manufacturer of DPT vaccine
which caused their son's death).
83. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) ("Except as [otherwise provided], State law shall apply to a
civil action brought for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death.").
84. See, e.g., Hurley, 851 F.2d at 154 ("[T]he NCVI Act ... is relevant as proof that Congress
intends no preemption of the state law liability of vaccine manufacturers. The NCVI Act clearly
states that state law remedies apply to the manufacturers and sale of vaccines.").
85. See, e.g., Tobin, 993 F.2d at 537-538 (holding that FDA approval of nitodrine hydrochlo-
ride did not preempt a state action, based on the holding in Hurley dealing with a vaccine).
86. See id. (relying solely on a single vaccine case for the proposition that the FDC Act does
not preempt state law); In re Tetracycline Cases, 747 F. Supp. 543, 548 (W.D. Mo. 1989) ("Pre-
emption does not bar state common law tort actions of failure to warn adequately in a case about
antibiotics.").
87. See infra notes 88, 93, 101 (addressing cases where courts invoked these presumptions).
88. 844 F.2d 1108 (4th Cir. 1988).
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testing, distribution, labeling, review and approval of all drugs and bi-
ologicals." 89 Nonetheless, continued the Abbot court, "[p]reemption
does not follow immediately from the comprehensive federal regula-
tion of prescription biological products." 90 The Court then enumer-
ated the five above-mentioned presumptions against preemption and
simply asserted, without further analysis or elaboration, that Congress
had not impliedly preempted state regulation of vaccine manufacture
by occupying the field.91 Other courts have adopted this strategy of
justification through mere enumeration.92
There remain two fundamental facts ignored by the case law em-
ploying the multiple-presumptions-against-preemption approach. The
first is that the presumptions are merely that - presumptions, not
irrebuttable conclusions. Mere recitation of the presumptions, there-
fore, does not answer the question of whether implied preemption
should be found. Instead, courts should recognize that under a princi-
pled analytical framework certain showings must be adequate to over-
come the various presumptions.
Second, at an even more basic level, several of the above presump-
tions against preemption are simply inapplicable to the pharmaceuti-
cal context. Consider first the heavily relied upon presumption that
"the regulation of health and safety matters is primarily, and histori-
cally, a matter of local concern. '93 This mantra is a holdover from the
days before the federal government became a major financier of med-
ical costs through Medicare 94 and Medicaid 95. Indeed, the complex
federal statutory schemes that govern health matters (such as the Pub-
lic Health Service Act 96 and the NCVI Act) and the recent effort to
reform health care on a national basis spotlight the powerful federal
interests present in the regulation of health matters.97 The federal in-
terest is particularly strong here, moreover, because what is at issue is
not the "local" issue of how a doctor treats a patient but the national
question of whether states can burden the introduction of beneficial
pharmaceuticals - "our most cost-effective input in supplying the de-
89. Id. at 1112.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1490 (D. Kan. 1987) (observing that
"the FDA's regulations of prescription drugs is indeed far-reaching, if not pervasive[,]" but
nonetheless finding no preemption).
93. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
94. See 42 U.S.C. § 1305.
95. See id. § 1396.
96. Id. § 215 (1988).
97. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 84 (1993)
(concurring opinion) ("Public health is a valid federal purpose.").
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mand for health" 98 - into interstate commerce by imposing different
obligations on pharmaceutical manufacturers. 99 Consequently, since
health concerns generally are no longer "primarily . . .a matter of
local concern," and never were with respect to interstate commerce in
prescription drugs, the force of this antiquated presumption against
preemption is blunted. 100
Consider next the presumption against finding preemption due
merely to the comprehensiveness of regulations as opposed to a stat-
ute.10' The fact is that the FDC Act statute itself comprehensively
regulates drugs, and the FDA's regulations are merely more detailed
elaborations of the FDC Act's requirements. For example, the statute
specifically mandates that as part of an application for a new drug a
company must file:
(A) full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is
effective in use; (B) a full list of the articles used as components of
such drug; (C) a full statement of the composition of such drug; (D)
a full description of the methods used in, and the facilities and con-
trols used for, the manufacture, processing, and packing of such
drug; (E) such samples of such drug and of the articles used as com-
ponents thereof as the Secretary may require; and (F) specimens of
the labeling proposed to be used for such drug.102
The statute also mandates that all applications include "adequate tests
by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug
is safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or sug-
gested in the proposed labeling thereof."'01 3 The statute also requires
that the drug manufacturer continue to "make such reports to the
[FDA], of data relating to clinical experience and other data or infor-
mation, received ... by such applicant with respect to such drug, as
the [FDA] may by general regulation ...prescribe" to facilitate a
determination whether there may be grounds to withdraw approval of
the NDA under § 505(e) of the Act.'04 Similar exhaustive detail is
98. Yale Brozen, Statements, in DRuGS AND HEALTH: ECONOMIC ISSUE AND POLICY OBJEC-
"rivEs 305 (Robert B. Helms ed. 1981).
99. Cf. H.R. REP. No. 853, supra note 11, at 45 ("The Committee recognizes that if a substan-
tial number of differing requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdictions
other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly burdened.").
100. Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985).
101. See Abbot v. American Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
304 (1993) ("Courts are more reluctant to infer preemption from the comprehensiveness of regu-
lations than from the comprehensiveness of statutes.").
102. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (emphasis added).
103. Id. § 355(d) (emphasis added).
104. Id. § 355(k).
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employed by the statute in specifying the grounds for refusing applica-
tions, approving applications, and withdrawing approval.105
It is hard to imagine a more detailed statute. It cannot be the case
that comprehensiveness for preemption purposes is defeated by the
mere fact that a governmental body other than Congress (e.g., courts
or administrative agencies) helps apply a statute. Indeed, if this were
the case, then no statute would ever be found to be comprehensive for
the purposes of preemption analysis, for no complex statutory scheme
can be wholly self-executing; there always is need for a governmental
body aside from the legislature to help specify a statute's concrete ap-
plication. Other statutory schemes found to occupy a field certainly
have been no more detailed than the FDC Act.' °6
In any event, the presumption against inferring comprehensiveness
from regulations alone is not, by definition, a general presumption
against preemption, but is only a presumption against finding that
Congress intended to occupy the field. Consequently, this presump-
tion is, at the very least, inapplicable to arguments that state law con-
flicts with federal law. 07
Finally, consider the presumption against finding preemption when
doing so would leave injured parties without a remedy. This presump-
tion is inapplicable to the drug context because injured persons do
have legal recourse.'0 8 First, injured parties may bring claims against
their health providers where the decision to prescribe the drug was
medically inappropriate or where the physician failed to obtain the
patient's informed consent.' 0 9 Second, in the event that the United
105. See id. § 355(d)-(e) (setting out the specific grounds for approval and withdrawal of ap-
proval of an application); see also Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1112 (detailing FDA requirements for
regulating prescription drugs).
106. See, e.g., Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297, 302 (1961) (holding that the Tobacco Inspec-
tion Act, 7 U.S.C. § 511(b), occupies the field of tobacco classification); Castle v. Hayes Freight
Lines, 348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954) (finding that the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 306, occupies the
field of carrying goods by motor truck in interstate commerce).
107. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (quoting Florida Line &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)) (explaining that even "[i]f Congress
has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-
empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law").
108. See infra notes 109-111 (discussing cases where persons have recourse).
109. See, e.g., King v. Ahrens, 16 F.3d 265 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding the decision to prescribe
drugs was inappropriate); Mary v. Moore, 424 So. 2d 596 (Ala. 1982) (wrongful death action for
inappropriate prescription and treatment of new born baby); Vandi v. Permanente Medical
Group, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 463 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (finding liability where doctor failed to
inform patient of the availability of a C.T. scan); Lacy v. G. D. Searle & Co., 567 A.2d 398 (Del.
1989) (involving claim against a doctor who inserted IUD device too soon after plaintiff had
given birth and doctor failed to warn of medical risks); Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical
Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387 (Ill. 1987) (finding liability for failing to warn that the prescribed drug
therazine would diminish patient's physical and mental abilities); Merlo v. Parisi, 627 N.E.2d 309
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States obtains a criminal judgment against a manufacturer who has
failed to meet FDA standards, a court may, as part of any sentence,
award restitution to those harmed." 0 Lastly, parties may well be per-
mitted to bring actions against the FDA where inadequate supervision
of pharmaceutical marketing has deprived a person of life or liberty
without due process."'
D. Arguments for Implied Preemption of Claims Involving
Prescription Drugs
Even if all the aforementioned presumptions were applicable,
courts should find these presumptions overcome with respect to state
based tort or contract claims involving drugs regulated by the FDC
Act. Courts should find implied preemption because an analysis of
the comprehensive FDC Act provisions demonstrates that federal law
fully occupies the field of prescription drug regulation. Alternatively,
state claims should be found preempted because permitting state tort
claims, at least when the manufacturer has complied with the regula-
tory requirements, directly conflicts with the FDC Act.
1. Federal Law Occupies the Field of Drug Regulation
As noted above, courts will find implied preemption where federal
law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field "as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement
it."112 The federal regulatory scheme governing pharmaceutical prod-
ucts is no less comprehensive than other schemes found to have occu-
pied the legislative field.
As discussed more fully above, the FDC Act and regulations there-
under govern the approval for sale, labeling, manufacture, distribu-
tion, and post-approval monitoring of all drugs and vaccines."
3
Companies may not even clinically test new drugs, much less market
(I11. App. Ct. 1993) (finding doctor liable for failing to properly diagnose condition and inappro-
priate treatment with antibiotics).
110. 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(1) (1994); see also Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir.
1995) ("Courts in future criminal proceedings will, or should, be aware that restitution may be
the only redress for those harmed by manufacturers [of medical devices] who have failed to
comply with the provisions of the MDA.").
111. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (allowing suit against federal official for depri-
vation of constitutional rights where no alternative remedy available); Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (establishing that victims of a
constitutional violation by a federal official have the right to bring an action against the official
in federal court even though no statute confers such a right).
112. Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (quoting Rice
v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
113. 21 U.S.C. §§ 351-360 (1994); 21 C.F.R. §§ 211, 310, 600 (1995).
[Vol. 45:395
REVISITING IMPLIED PREEMPTION
them, without FDA approval.114 Companies are required to submit to
the FDA extensive clinical, pharmacological, and toxicological infor-
mation in the New Drug Application, as well as specimens of the la-
beling proposed to be used with the drug." 5 Only upon determining
that the new drug is "safe" and "effective" and that the labeling meets
rigorous FDA standards, will the NDA be approved, 116 and compa-
nies may not make any permanent changes to the labeling without
FDA approval. 17 Following approval by FDA, companies are subject
to stringent requirements to monitor all adverse drug experiences and
to submit a detailed annual report to the FDA containing information
regarding such adverse reactions and other published and unpublished
trials of the drug or vaccine, or other research information that might
affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the drug." 8 FDA regula-
tions also prescribe voluminous "good manufacturing practice regula-
tions" that govern how companies are to manufacture drugs." 9
In short, as one court has noted, the "FDA's regulation of prescrip-
tion drugs and biological products is comprehensive, . . . encom-
pass[ing] the licensing, production, testing, distribution, labeling,
review and approval of all drugs and biologicals."12 0 As another court
has observed, "[t]he FDA's regulation of prescription drugs is indeed
far-reaching, if not pervasive.'' l
Although courts have not proffered a framework for precisely com-
paring the level of complexity or comprehensiveness of different stat-
utory schemes for the purpose of ascertaining whether a statute
occupies the field under implied preemption doctrine, rough compari-
sons among statutes may be drawn on the bases of (1) the degree of
specificity included in the statute and (2) the extent to which federal
regulatory agencies have drafted regulations to oversee the statute's
implementation.
On the basis of these two criteria, federal law governing the drug
industry is no less "pervasive" and "complex" than the National La-
bor Relations Act ("NLRA"), which was found to preempt state law
in Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric, Railway and Motor
114. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a).
115. 21 U.S.C. § 355; 21 C.F.R. § 314.50 (1995).
116. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A).
117. 21 C.F.R. § 601.12 (1995).
118. Id. § 314.80 (1995).
119. Id. §§ 210, 211 (1995).
120. Abbot v. American Cyanamid, 844 F.2d 1108, 1112 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 304
(1993).
121. Graham v. Wyeth Labs., 666 F. Supp. 1483, 1490 (D. Kan. 1987).
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Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge.122 Indeed, the FDC Act
is, if anything, more complex and comprehensive than the NLRA,
both in terms of the specificity of the statute and the detail provided
by applicable regulations. 123 The FDC Act is also more comprehen-
sive on the basis of these criteria than the Federal Tobacco Inspection
Act,124 which was found to occupy the field of tobacco classification
and inspection in Campbell v. Hussey,125 and the Motor Carrier
Act, 126 found to occupy of the field of transportation of goods by
trucks in interstate commerce in Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines.127
By virtue of the specificity and comprehensiveness of the FDC
Act's regulation of prescription drugs, courts should find that state law
touching on pharmaceuticals, in any respect, or at least in respect of
their safety or efficacy, is preempted under the FDC Act. Accord-
ingly, state tort law requirements concerning prescription drugs, which
clearly and directly pertain to safety, should be held completely
preempted.
2. State Tort Law Conflicts With the Requirements of the FDC Act
State law conflicts with federal law for purposes of implied preemp-
tion when either (1) there is a direct conflict such that compliance
with both federal and state law is impossible or (2) state law stands as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes of Congress.
128
Under a careful analysis, state tort claims involving prescription drugs
are preempted under the FDC Act because they both directly conflict
with the federal regulatory scheme and because they stand as an ob-
stacle to the realization of Congress' goals in enacting the FDC Act.129
a. Direct Conflict
FDA decisions to allow a drug to be marketed under a specific label
reflect a complex cost-benefit calculus designed to maximize public
health and welfare. The FDA deliberately strikes a balance in its mar-
keting and labeling decisions between the benefits of a drug for pa-
122. 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971).
123. As a rough measure of the FDC Act's relative complexity, it should be observed that
whereas regulations implementing that act exhaust more than 3,000 pages in the Code of Federal
Regulations. By comparison, the regulations governing the NLRA occupy fewer than 110 pages.
124. 7 U.S.C. § 511 (1994).
125. See 368 U.S. 298, 302 (1961) (holding that the Tobacco Inspection Act occupies the field
of tobacco classification).
126. 49 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
127. See 348 U.S. 61, 63 (1954) (finding that the Motor Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. § 306, occupies
the field of transporting goods by motor truck in interstate commerce).
128. Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
129. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text (discussing federal preemption).
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tients in need of medical therapy and the inevitable risks of adverse
effects in a certain number of those who will use it. FDA approval of
a drug and its labeling signify the FDA's determination that the opti-
mal public health benefit will be achieved by the availability of the
drug and its use in accordance with the labeling. 130
State tort claims, on the other hand, whether premised on strict lia-
bility, negligence, or breach of warranty, are predicated on a challenge
to the correctness of the FDA's decisions and as such directly conflict
with the FDA's determination as to the optimal way to protect public
health. Indeed, it is physically impossible for manufacturers to com-
ply with both the FDC Act and state tort law when the former re-
quires that a drug be marketed and labeled as approved by the FDA
and the latter requires that it not be.
First, consider state tort actions for defective "design" (to the extent
these might be recognized under state law as to prescription drugs). 131
As just noted, the federal regulatory scheme is aimed at ensuring the
optimal availability of appropriate drugs. 132 Consistent with this, the
FDA only permits new drugs to be marketed when it has determined
that the drug is "safe" and "effective."'' 33 A state law defective design
claim, however, is a determination that a given pharmaceutical should
not have been marketed as designed. 34
As the Supreme Court has recognized, "state regulation can be as
effectively exerted through an award of damages as through some
form of preventive relief. The obligation to pay compensation can be,
indeed is designed to be, a potent method of governing conduct and
controlling policy.' 35 As such, state law defective design claims are
130. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (requiring manufacturers to provide FDA a "summary
of the benefits and risks of the drug, including a discussion of why the benefits exceed the risks"
as part of the NDA); see also United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) (noting that
the FDA "generally considers a drug safe when the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk
entailed by its use"); see generally Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability:
The Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 233, 237-38 (1986)
(explaining that the FDA has an interest in avoiding "information overload" and encouraging
"rational prescribing," which requires that the "risks and benefits of each particular drug be
presented fairly so that they can be compared by physicians with those of alternative therapies").
131. See Sprague v. Upjohn Co., Civ. A. No. 94-40035-NM6, 1995 WL 376934 (D. Mass. May
10, 1995) (dismissing negligent design claim because the drug had "only one possible formula-
tion" and consequently could not have been alternatively designed).
132. See supra note 130 (discussing the FDA's risk/benefit analysis).
133. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1)(A) (1994).
134. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096
(1974) (noting a product is defectively designed when it "so dangerous that a reasonable man
would not sell the product if he knew the risk involved").
135. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992) (quoting San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garman, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959)) (emphasis added).
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regulatory in effect and have the effect of influencing the conduct of
manufacturers to market a product different from that approved by
the FDA or to remove the product from the market. As the First
Circuit has said in the closely related context of medical devices, "[i]t
is clear that appellant's [tort] claim would impose requirements...
related to safety and effectiveness .... Appellant's claim would force
us to determine that [the product] is unsafe and dangerous, in opposi-
tion to the contrary determination made by the FDA.. .. -"136 Conse-
quently, defective design claims directly conflict with the FDA's
determination that an approved drug is safe and effective, and seek to
realize policies different from those of the FDA.137
Consider next the FDA's labeling requirements. As discussed
above, the FDA has the final say on what information is included in a
drug's labeling, including what associated adverse effects are reported
and how the reporting is phrased. 138 The FDA has stated clearly that
its labeling decisions reflect conscious policy choices not only about
what information should be included in drug labels, but also what in-
formation should not be included. 139 Enough information must be
given "for the safe and effective use of the drug,' 140 but excessive
warnings should not be given lest there be "information overload" or
over-deterrence of the use of the medication.' 4' Thus, drug labels are
intended to provide "only a summary of essential scientific informa-
tion [so that they are] as concise and clear as possible" and are "not
intended to be a dispositive treatise of all possible data and informa-
tion about a drug.' 42 Also, the FDA allows "labeling statements with
respect to safety only if they are supported by scientific evidence.' 43
Labeling should only warn of "[k]nown hazards and not theoretical
possibilities,"' and warnings may not include "statement[s] of differ-
ences of opinion.' 45
136. King v. Collagen, 983 F.2d 1130, 1135 (1st Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
137. The state policy behind defective design claims of protecting consumers by imposing
strict tort liability on manufacturers' products also conflicts with the FDA policy of ensuring that
safe and effective drugs are readily available to consumers by not unduly burdening the develop-
ment and marketing of such drugs.
138. See supra notes 114-19 and accompanying text (discussing labeling requirements).
139. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing labeling guidelines).
140. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (1994).
141. See Cooper, supra note 130, at 237-38.
142. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,440-41 (1979) (emphasis added).
143. 44 Fed. Reg. 37,441 (1979).
144. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(d) (1995).
145. 21 C.F.R. § 1.21(c)(1) (1995).
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State tort actions for failure to warn, however, are bottomed on the
conclusion that the FDA-approved label is inadequate.' 46 Given the
regulatory consequences of state tort claims,147 a failure-to-warn claim
is aimed has the effect of encouraging companies to employ a different
label than what the FDA has approved (generally, to include more
warnings). As a result, state law failure-to-warn claims stand in direct
conflict with the FDA's approval of a label.148
Indeed, state law failure-to-warn claims relating to pharmaceuticals
are nearly identical to the state law attempts to regulate tobacco label-
ling, which the Supreme Court held to be preempted in Campbell v.
Hussey.149 That case involved The Federal Tobacco Inspection Act,
which provides standards for the classification and inspection of to-
bacco. 50 The State of Georgia passed a law requiring that one type of
tobacco grown in Georgia, Florida or Alabama be labeled with a
white tag.' 5' The Court rejected the claim that "labeling it by its geo-
graphical origin merely supplements the federal regulation and does not
conflict with it," and held that the state law was preempted. 5 2 Simi-
larly, state failure-to-warn claims do not merely seek to supplement,
but would directly conflict with, the labeling requirements set by the
FDC Act and the decisions of the FDA under the act.
This conflict between state failure-to-warn claims and FDA labeling
requirements is perhaps most acutely illustrated by instances, well
known to many pharmaceutical manufacturers, where the FDA has
146. See, e.g., Seley v. G.D. Searle & Co,, 423 N.E. 2d 831, 836 (Ohio 1981) (finding that a
drug may be considered "defective" and unreasonably dangerous if it fails to provide adequate
warning of all inherent potential adverse reactions); see generally Note, A Question of Compe-
tence: The Judicial Role in the Regulation of Pharmaceuticals, 103 HAJv. L. REV. 773, 788-789
(1990) (discussing that tort liability, undermining FDA standards and frustrating FDA objec-
tives, are "particularly evident in cases premised on warning inadequacy").
147. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2620 (1992) (finding that state
regulation is effective through awarding damages or preventive relief).
148. See Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) ("A
holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable ... where compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce."); Farm-
ers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 534-35 (1959) (finding implied preemption of
state defamation law under Section 315(a) of the Federal Communications Act, which required
radio licensees to allow candidates for office "equal opportunity" access without the "power of
censorship," because allowing state law defamation actions against the licensees would "sanction
the unconscionable result of permitting civil and perhaps criminal liability to be imposed for the
very conduct the statute demands of the licensee"); see also Hurley v. Lederle Labs., 863 F.2d
1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1988) ("It would be patently inconsistent for a state to hold the manufac-
turer liable for including [the] precise warning [approved by the FDA] when the manufacturer
would otherwise be liable for not including it.") (emphasis added).
149. 368 U.S. 298, 302 (1961).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 368 U.S. at 300-01 (emphasis added).
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expressly rejected stronger warnings proposed by the manufacturer it-
self - on the ground, for example, that the stronger warning is not
scientifically supported, or would over-deter the drug's use - and the
manufacturer has subsequently been faced with a lawsuit under a state
law failure-to-warn theory for not employing that very warning. Such
cases exemplify the fact that obeying both the FDA's requirements
and state law labeling requirements is a physical impossibility, and
that state tort suits for failure to warn or inadequate warnings must be
held to be impliedly preempted. 153
b. Obstacles to Accomplishing Congress' Intent Behind the FDC
Act
Even in the absence of a direct conflict between state and federal
laws, state law that has the effect of discouraging conduct that federal
law seeks to encourage also conflicts with federal law and is subject to
implied preemption. 54 State tort law concerning prescription drugs
should be held to be preempted under this principle as well.
As discussed above, the aim of the FDC Act is to maximize the
health benefits of prescription drugs while minimizing the attendant
risks. 155 In coming to its determination as to what label is sufficient,
for example, the FDA balances the benefits of full disclosure against
the risk that too much disclosure or overemphasis of adverse effects
will lead to information overload on the part of the drug prescriber or
may in fact over-deter drug use.' 56 Similarly, FDA approval of the
marketing of a drug (i.e., its NDA) indicates that, after weighing these
complex factors, the FDA has determined that making the drug avail-
able will bring the optimal health benefit to society.157
Against the background of FDA approval of a drug, state tort law
recoveries directly conflict with the federal goal of ensuring prompt
and affordable availability of reasonably safe drugs. Conceivably, the
prospect of tort liability could well lead manufacturers to delay plac-
153. See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985).
154. See Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235, 239 (1967) (invalidating a state unem-
ployment compensation law insofar as it denied benefits to otherwise eligible applicants solely
because they had filed unfair labor practice charge with the NLRB on the basis that such law
discouraged applicants from exercising their rights under the NLRB).
155. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
156. See 44 Fed. Reg. 37,440-41 (1979) (emphasizing that drug labeling is intended to provide
"only a summary of essential scientific information" and is "not intended to be a dispositive
treatise of all possible data and information about a drug); see generally Cooper, supra note 130,
at 237-38 (explaining the FDA's regulatory objective that the risks and benefits be presented
fairly while avoiding irrational decisions based on over-dramatization of the risks).
157. See United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 544, 555 (discussing the FDA's balancing
between expected therapeutic gain and the risk entailed by the drug's use).
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ing new products on the market even after receiving FDA approval in
order to do additional testing, thereby delaying the introduction of
new drugs beneficial to the public.158 Further, the added expense of
insuring new drugs against product liability claims could cause the cost
of medication to increase to the extent that it would no longer be af-
fordable to consumers. 159
Similarly, manufacturers in some instances may be led to stop pro-
ducing valuable FDA-approved drugs because of the costs associated
with state law-based product liability suits or the inability to secure
adequate insurance. 160 Indeed, several FDA-approved drugs have
been discontinued due to the costs of tort litigation. 161 Additionally,
fears of liability may inhibit the development of drugs in the first in-
stance by skewing research and development incentives away from
fields that contain high background risks, such as pregnancy.162
For all these reasons, state tort law should be preempted because it
may well discourage the development or marketing of beneficial
drugs. The possibility of deterring development is contrary to the
FDC Act's fundamental goal of making such drugs available.' 63
III. THREE POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO IMPLIED PREEMPTION
In the event that courts incorrectly view the inapplicability of im-
plied preemption to prescription drug lawsuits as settled law, and re-
158. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479-80 (Cal. 1988) (determining that
"[p]ublic policy favors the development and marketing of beneficial new drugs, even though
some risks [are present] ... because drugs can save lives and reduce pain and suffering").
159. See id. (determining that strict liability and costly insurance are likely to have a negative
impact on research and development of new drugs by manufacturers and the affordability of
those drugs actually marketed).
160. See id. (citing several potentially useful drugs that were withdrawn from the market or
whose availability was severely curtailed because of tort liability); see also Note, supra note 146,
at 774 (documenting that manufacturers removed the FDA-approved drugs Oculinum and
Bendectin from the market due to tort lawsuits).
161. See Thomas Scarlett, The Relationship Among Adverse Drug Reaction Reporting, Drug
Labeling, Product Liability, and Federal Preemption, 46 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 31, 38 n.17
(1991) (noting that large product liability awards caused the discontinuation of specific products
such as Bendectin and the CU-7 intrauterine device even though the manufacturer complied
with FDA marketing regulations); Note, supra note 146, at 774 (documenting that manufacturers
removed Oculinum and Bendectin, FDA-approved drugs, from the market due to tort liability).
162. See Note, supra note 146, at 775 (arguing that the state tort liability system undermines
the availability of pharmaceuticals due to the fear of excessive liability and uninsurability).
163. See Nash v. Florida Indus. Comm'n, 389 U.S. 235,239 (1967) (concluding that a state law
which frustrates the purpose of federal legislation or impairs the efficiency of federal agencies
cannot stand); Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 93 (Utah 1991) (noting problems of
"delayed availability of needed drugs and imposition of the costs of research, development and
marketing of new products beyond that which manufacturers, especially small manufacturers,
might be willing to risk").
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fuse to revisit and correct that law, there are at least three alternatives
to preemption that can accomplish many of its desirable public policy
objectives. These largely unchartered alternatives, two judicial and
one legislative, are discussed below. Subsection A of this part will
explore the possibility of imposing federal common law negligence
and strict liability standards equivalent to FDC Act standards in
otherwise state law-based product liability claims. Subsection B will
examine the possibility of adopting FDC Act requirements as the
standard for pharmaceutical manufacturers' duties as a matter of state
law. Subsection C will briefly discuss several federal and state legisla-
tive options for achieving much the same public policy objectives.
A. Federal Common Law
Preemption is not the only doctrine by which federal law may dis-
place state law. An alternative that may possess certain advantages
over preemption and that, to date, does not appear to have been em-
ployed in the drug or vaccine context is to seek the creation and appli-
cation of federal common law.
Under this approach, a federal common law of product liability pro-
viding uniform standards of behavior for the pharmaceutical industry
should be recognized - with the standards supplied by the FDC Act
and the FDA's regulations thereunder. By virtue of the Supremacy
Clause, the standard would be substituted for any definition of the
manufacturers' duties under state law. After an overview of the doc-
trine of federal common law generally in the first subsection below,
the second subsection will explain the appropriateness of employing a
uniform federal common law rule with respect to tort claims in the
pharmaceutical context.
1. Overview of Federal Common Law
Federal common law, of course, refers to federal law that is created
by judges. While Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins' 64 famously de-
clared the demise of "federal general common law," federal common
law to implement particular federal statutes still flourishes. 165
For example, in the case of Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 66 a union brought an action in district court seeking to force an
employer to arbitrate in accordance with the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement negotiated in accordance with the Labor Man-
164. 304 U.S. 64, 82-83 (1938).
165. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 383, 421 (referring to continued existence of specialized "federal common law").
166. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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agement Relations Act ("LMR Act"). The Supreme Court rejected
the state's general common law rule against enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements and substituted a federal common law rule that arbi-
tration clauses in contracts negotiated pursuant to the LMR Act
would be enforceable, citing to the LMR Act's general grant of juris-
diction to the federal district courts as the sole source for its power to
do so.167 Although the LMR Act was silent with respect to arbitra-
tion, the Court reasoned that one of the Act's purposes was to avoid
strikes, and that arbitration was the quid pro quo for the Union's
promise not to strike under the collective bargaining agreement. Con-
sequently, the policy behind the Act could be realized only by employ-
ing a federal common law rule upholding arbitration clauses in
agreements within the scope of the LMR Act.168 Federal common law
displacing general common law also has been employed to implement
many other federal statutes, including the Federal Communications
Act,169 the Lanham Act,170 the Interstate Commerce Act,171 the Sher-
man Act,172 the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,173 and the fed-
eral securities acts, 174 to name but a few.
Importantly, in contrast to pre-Erie federal common law, which was
applicable only in federal courts (thus causing the problem of two in-
consistent legal regimes, federal and state), contemporary federal
common law is binding on states as well. As such, federal common
law is uniform and binding in every judicial forum. 175 And, as has
167. Id. at 456.
168. See id. at 455 ("The substantive law to be applied under [the LMR Act] is federal law
which the courts must fashion from the policy of our national labor laws.") (emphasis added).
169. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 531 (1959) (creating immu-
nity from defamation as a matter of federal common law).
170. See Huber Baking Co. v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 252 F.2d 945, 952-53 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958) (rejecting common law requirement of affixation and use for acquisi-
tion of a trademark and creating uniform federal rule for acquisition of a "collective mark"
under the Lanham Act).
171. See Francis v. Southern Pac. Co., 333 U.S. 445, 450 (1978) (federal common law overrides
state common law affecting interstate carriers).
172. See Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942) (holding that whether a
patent licensee is estopped to challenge a price-fixing clause in the license agreement under the
Sherman Act is a matter of federal common law and that state law governing estoppel "must
yield").
173. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (law governing abatement of public nui-
sance is governed by federal common law).
174. See, e.g, Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975) (noting the
federal common law development of the doctrine of "deceptive and manipulative" practices
under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934).
175. See Friendly, supra note 165, at 405 ("By leaving to the states what ought be left to them,
Erie led to the emergence of a federal decisional law in areas of national concern that is truly
uniform because, under the supremacy clause, it is binding in every forum .... ").
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been adverted to above, and as will be discussed below, it is precisely
this type of uniformity that is so important in the field of prescription
drugs. 176
As shown by the large number of cases where federal common law
has displaced state common law for purposes of implementing a par-
ticular statute, courts appear somewhat more willing to employ fed-
eral common law than implied preemption. Courts' greater
willingness to employ federal common law may be attributable to the
fact that, in contrast to preemption, federal common law is not depen-
dent solely on locating Congress' "intent" but is premised upon the
practical necessity of filling the interstices left by Congressional enact-
ments so that the statutory scheme may be effectuated. 177 Consistent
with the fact that federal common law is not so tightly bound to the
tether of Congress' "intent," courts often textually justify their devel-
opment of federal common law solely on the basis of statutory lan-
guage granting them jurisdiction in a particular field - even in the
absence of substantive statutory provisions relating to the field at is-
sue in the litigation. 178
Greater willingness to apply federal common law than preemption
also may be due to the fact that federal common law is arguably less
disruptive of state law than is preemption. Whereas preemption gen-
erally obliterates an entire state claim, federal common law generally
displaces only a single element of the claim. 179
176. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of uniform prescrip-
tion drug laws).
177. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957) ("We conclude that
the substantive law to apply.., under [the statute] is federal law which the courts must fashion
from the policy of our national labor laws.") (emphasis added); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 470 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) ("Were we bereft of the common law,
our federal system would be impotent. This follows from the recognized futility of attempting
all-complete statutory codes."); Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law," 105 U. PA.
L. REV. 797, 800 (1957) ("[E]ffective Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the
federal courts to declare as a matter of common law or 'judicial legislation', rules which may be
necessary to fill interstitially or otherwise effectuate the statutory patterns enacted in the large by
Congress.") (emphasis added); 19 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, et. al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 4514, at 220 (noting that "[u]sually, federal common law is exercised only when Con-
gress has not spoken to an issue").
178. See Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 (relying solely on a general jurisdictional grant as the
source for its federal common law rule); see also Texas v. New York, 397 U.S. 674 (1965) (relying
on jurisdictional grant to create federal common law regarding relations between states).
179. See e.g., Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173 (1942) (addressing whether
defendant may assert defense of invalid patent when sued for royalties); Deitrick v. Greaney,
309 U.S. 190, 201 (1940) (discussing whether party may raise defense of illegality against suit to
compel payment of a promissory note under the National Bank Act is a question of federal
common law); Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 458 (displacing defense that agreements to arbitrate are
unenforceable while not eliminating state contract law generally).
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In short, whereas preemption is a doctrine focused on identifying
Congress' intent, federal common law is primarily connected to what,
as a practical matter, is necessary to implement a given federal statu-
tory scheme. Moreover, federal common law only operates to the
minimum extent necessary to effectuate the federal purpose.
2. Federal Common Law's Application To Prescription Drugs
In the case of product liability claims involving prescription drugs,
rather than arguing that the FDC Act preempts all state tort actions,
the proponent of federal common law need only point to the FDC
Act's grant of jurisdiction to the federal district courts and the FDC
Act's provisions concerning the design and labeling of prescription
drugs as sources for generating federal common law. 180 The applica-
ble substantive law would then have to be formulated from the policy
of our federal drug laws.181 Substituting a uniform tort standard based
on the federal statutes and regulations is necessary to realize the
objectives underlying the FDC Act explored in greater detail above,
for only a uniform FDC Act-based standard can avoid the danger of
inhibiting the optimal availability of pharmaceuticals that would be
caused by permitting differing state standards to coexist with the FDC
Act standards. 182
In contrast to the result under preemption doctrine, state negli-
gence and strict liability actions would not be wholly displaced under a
federal common law approach. Compliance with federal standards,
however, would satisfy a company's duty of care under negligence ac-
tions relating to the "design" of a drug and would be conclusive evi-
180. See 21 U.S.C. 334(a)(1) (1994) (providing that the manufacturer of "[a]ny ... drug ...
that is... misbranded... or which may not.., be introduced into interstate commerce, shall be
liable to be proceeded against ... in any district court of the United States"). Reliance on the
jurisdictional grant to deploy federal common law to effectuate the policies of a statute is distinct
from the legal question whether a statute provides a private right of action.
181. See, e.g., Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. at 456 (asserting that the policy of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act is best effectuated by enforcing arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements under federal, rather than state law). Indeed, the reasons for creating federal com-
mon law are even more compelling under the FDC Act than under the LMR Act in Lincoln
Mills. After all, whereas the LMR Act was silent with respect to arbitration clauses, the subject
of federal common law in that case, the FDC Act explicitly regulates design, manufacturing, and
labeling of prescription drugs.
182. Cf Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525, 531 (1959) (creating federal
common law immunity to defamation suits in order to further statutory purpose); see also Leslie
A. Rubin, Confronting a New Obstacle to Reproductive Choice: Encouraging the Development
of RU-486 Through Reform Liability Law, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 131 (1990/91)
(arguing that Senator Kasten's products liability bill then in Congress would resolve the uncer-




dence that the design is not unreasonably dangerous under a strict
liability claim. 183 Similarly, obeying the FDA's labeling requirements
would be conclusive evidence that an adequate warning was
provided. 184
The reasonableness of the federal common law approach outlined
above is well illustrated by the fact that it is virtually identical to the
approach taken to state tort law in the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act. 85 In the NCVI Act, Congress gave access to state tort law
claims to those injured by vaccines.' 86 However, Congress federalized
one element of the tort claim, providing in effect that compliance with
FDA regulations generates an unrebuttable presumption of non-liabil-
ity with respect to "unavoidable" side effects. 187 Federal common law
operates the same way: state tort claims survive, but a single element
of the claim is displaced by federal law.
Courts need not fear that by adopting federal common law they
would be embracing an approach only semantically different from
preemption, for there are real differences between federal common
law and preemption (at least as applied by the majority of courts) that
justify the different doctrinal frameworks employed by each. Under a
federal common law approach, for example, companies that commit
fraud in obtaining FDA approval could be held liable for state tort law
actions. This stands in stark contrast to the line of medical device
cases holding that because the Medical Device Amendments preempt
state tort law, injured persons have no recourse to state law even
where manufacturers have committed a fraud on the FDA by supply-
183. See Ministry of Health v. Shiley, Inc., 858 F. Supp. 1426 (C.D. Ca. 1994) (ruling that to
permit finding of negligence if manufacturer compiled with FDA standards would be to imply
that FDA standards are not sufficient).
184. See, e.g., Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 803 P.2d 167 (Cal. 1993) (finding that the FDA labeling
requirements provide the appropriate standard of care).
185. Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755-3784 (1986).
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(a) (1988) ("Except as provided .... State law shall apply to a
civil action brought for damages for a vaccine-related injury or death.").
187. Under the NCVI Act, if vaccine makers comply in all material respects with the require-
ments of the FDC Act, then the manufacturers can be held liable for injuries caused by vaccines
only if the injury or death was "avoidable." 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b) (To date, no case law has
clarified what "avoidable" means in this context.). Even then, manufacturers are immune from
punitive damages, if they have complied in all material respects with requirements under the
FDC Act. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-23(d)(2) (prohibiting the award of punitive damages if "manufac-
turer shows that it complied, in all material respects, with all requirements under the" FDC Act);
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-22(b)(2) ("A vaccine shall be presumed to be accompanied by proper direction
and warnings if the vaccine manufacturer shows that it complied in all materials respects with all
requirements under the" FDC Act.) (emphasis added).
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ing incomplete or inaccurate information with their FDA
applications. 188
In short, for courts that incorrectly perceive the preemption ques-
tion to be settled, or persist in a flawed preemption analysis, the con-
clusion that federal common law controls the standard of liability
nevertheless may be accepted. Federal common law is arguably less
disruptive of state law than preemption, affords somewhat less abso-
lute protection to pharmaceutical companies and is the minimum
measure necessary to fulfill Congress' purposes in enacting the FDC
Act.
B. Adopting Federal Standards As A Matter Of State Law
A second judicially available alternative to preemption for courts
unwilling to address or accept a federal common law standard would
be for courts to hold, as a matter of state law, that satisfaction of the
FDC Act's requirements constitutes conclusive evidence that manu-
facturers have lived up to their duties. Under this approach, FDC Act
compliance would satisfy state due care standards under negligent de-
sign claims and would be conclusive evidence that the design is not
defective under strict liability doctrine. Similarly, compliance with
FDC Act labeling requirements would satisfy state duty-to-warn
standards. 189
Several state courts have in effect followed this approach as to vari-
ous state law claims involving prescription drugs.190 This approach is
consistent with well-accepted principles of tort law found in the recent
draft of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, under which a court may
"properly conclude that a particular product safety standard set by
statute or regulation adequately serves the objectives of tort law and
therefore that the product that complies with the standard is not de-
188. See, e.g., Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1995) (finding that because
Congress did not intend to establish a fraud-on-the-FDA exception to the preemption provision,
no state law cause of action can exist); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1134 (1st Cir.
1993) (ruling allegations of fraud are expressly preempted by the MDA preemption provision, 21
U.S.C. § 360K).
189. Ramirez v. Plough, Inc., 863 P.2d 167, 176 (Cal. 1993).
190. See, e.g., id. (holding that the FDA regulations establish the standard of care for packag-
ing and labeling drugs); Grundberg v. Upjohn Company, 813 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1991) (holding
that "all prescription drugs should be classified as unavoidably dangerous in design [and there-
fore exempt from strict liability as a matter of law under comment k of Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 402A] because of their unique nature and value, the elaborate regulatory system over-
seen by the FDA, the difficulties of relying on individual lawsuits as a forum in which to review a
prescription drug's design, and significant public policy considerations").
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fective as a matter of law."'191 Finding that compliance with regulation
satisfies a manufacturer's duties under tort law is particularly "appro-
priate when the safety statute or regulation was promulgated recently,
thus supplying currency to the standard therein established,"'1 92 as is
the case with the FDA's regulations. Finally, finding compliance to
satisfy a manufacturer's tort duties as a matter of state law is "espe-
cially appropriate when the court is confident that the deliberative
process by which the safety standard was established was thorough
and responsible and reflected substantial expertise," as is undoubtedly
the case with the FDA.193
Indeed, as discussed earlier, allowing state tort liability could lead
to many devastating public policy consequences. If tort liability were
imposed atop the FDA's detailed regulatory controls, drug manufac-
191. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TORTS § 7 (Tentative Draft March 13, 1995) (emphasis
added).
192. Id.
193. Id. Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provided that a court may "adopt as the
standard of conduct of a reasonable man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an ad-
ministrative regulation" if the purpose of the statute or regulation is found to be exclusively or in
part:
(a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded, and
(b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded, and
(c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which has resulted, and
(d) to protect that interest against the particular hazard from which the harm results.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
The FDA's extensive application process and its labeling requirements both satisfy precisely
these standards. See 21 U.S.C. § 355 (providing rigorous application procedures), see also 21
C.F.R. § 314.50 (setting forth rigorous requirements for an application's content). As discussed
more fully above, a new drug may be marketed only upon FDA approval of its NDA, which
requires clinical and other evidence that the drug is "safe and effective." 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
In accordance with the Restatement's standard, FDA requirements are intended to protect the
public's health and welfare against physical harm caused by unsafe drugs resulting in bodily
injury or death. For a thorough discussion of the liability standards applied in drug cases see
STUART M. SPEISER et al., THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS, § 18.378 (1989). Similarly, the FDA's
labeling requirements, which are designed to protect prescription drugs users from avoidable
harm resulting from adverse effects of the drug, also satisfy the Restatement's standard. See, e.g.,
44 Fed. Reg. 37,437 (1979) (stating that the purpose of drug labeling is "to enable practitioners to
use a drug safely and effectively for its intended purpose").
The Restatement rule is eminently sensible in the prescription drug context, where permitting
state tort liability lawsuits may have direct public health implications. "Allowing individual
courts and/or juries to continually reevaluate a drug's risks and benefits ignores the processes of
[the] expert regulatory body [the FDA]." Grundberg v. Upjohn Co., 813 P.2d 89, 97 (Utah
1991). Lay judges and juries are not the proper forum for making the complex public health
risk/benefit analysis necessary to determining whether a drug ought to be marketed. Id. at 98;
see James A. Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The
Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531 (1973) (arguing that courts are "inherently
unsuited to the task of establishing product safety standards: in cases involving product liability
of manufacturers); see also Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13, 17-19 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating
that state common-law claims related to pacemaker's safety -and effectiveness were preempted
by MDA to the federal FDC Act).
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turers might be led to delay placing new products on the market in
order to do additional testing even after receiving FDA approval,
thereby delaying the introduction of new drugs and undercutting the
public's interest in the prompt availability of new medical treat-
ment.194 Further, the added expense of insuring against new products
might lead to an increase in the cost of medication that would make
certain pharmaceuticals unaffordable to consumers.' 95 Most devast-
ingly, manufacturers might be led to stop producing, or to forego de-
veloping, valuable drugs altogether because of actual or anticipated
lost profits resulting from lawsuits or the inability to secure adequate
insurance. 196
None of these undesirable consequences should come as a surprise
because, more generally, tort liability imposed on top of regulatory
controls creates "a considerable danger of overdeterrence" of socially
useful activities and "threatens to perpetuate some of the very
problems that led to the creation of regulatory programs" in the first
place. 197
Finally, a court that refuses to adopt preemption or the federal com-
mon law alternative discussed above may well be willing to adopt the
FDC Act's regulatory standards as a matter of state law which, being a
matter of state law, obviously is less disruptive of state sovereignty
than either preemption of federal common law, both of which displace
state law to some extent. From the perspective of the policies embod-
ied in the FDC Act, however, the downside to this option is that it
would have to be adopted on a piecemeal state-by-state basis. Even
assuming ultimate success in convincing fifty separate state supreme
courts of the merits of this position, there would be considerable un-
certainty - with the attendant negative public health consequences
before their pronouncements.
194. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 479-80 (1988) (noting that public policy fa-
vors the rapid development and marketing of new drugs, despite the possibility of risks, because
such drugs have the ability to prevent deaths and reduce suffering).
195. Id.
196. Id. (listing several valuable drugs removed from the market due to tort liability including
Bendectin, various vaccines, and a new drug designed to treat optical problems).
197. 2 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 87
(Reporters' Study 1991); see, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,448-49 (1976)
("[M]anagement's fear of exposing itself to substantial liability may cause it simply to bury the
[public] in an avalanche of trivial information-a result that is hardly conducive to informed
decision making.").
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C. Several Legislative Options
Finally, in the event that courts unwisely refuse to adopt any of the
judicial alternatives discussed above, there are various federal and
state legislative options that also could accomplish much, if not all, of
the aims sought by Congress in enacting the FDC Act.
1. Possible Federal Statutory Amendments
While Congress has begun contemplating piecemeal legislative re-
form that would limit, or in some instances eliminate, prescription
drug manufacturers' punitive and non-economic damages, 198 the most
desirable legislative solution would be the adoption of an explicit pre-
emption provision akin to 21 U.S. Code § 360k, the FDC Act provi-
sion governing medical devices. It is telling that when Congress
actually considered the need for preemption in the medical device
context, it concluded that preemption was necessary. The appropri-
ateness of having a similar provision in the pharmaceutical context is
underscored by the fact that the identical policy concerns undergirding
198. While there is no certainty as to its ultimate contours, it is likely that some legislation
affecting medical devices and drugs will be passed by the 104th Congress. Whether such legisla-
tion (if passed) will attract, and if so be able to overcome, a presidential veto, is also quite
uncertain.
Under the bill that recently passed the House of Representatives, referred to as the "Common
Sense Legal Standards Reform Act of 1995," punitive damages will be barred in actions against a
manufacturer or seller of a drug or device, as defined under Section 201(g)(1) of the FDC Act,
21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1), where: (1) the drug or device was subject to pre-market approval by the
FDA "with respect to the safety of the formulation or performance of the aspect of such drug or
device which caused the claimant's harm or the adequacy of the packaging or labeling of such
drug or device, and such drug or device was approved by" the FDA; or (2) "the drug is generally
recognized as safe and effective pursuant to conditions" established by the FDA. H.R. REP. No.
956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 201(0 (1995). The proposed legislation would apply to civil actions
brought in state as well as federal courts. Id. § 201(c).
The proposed legislation, therefore, would operate to put into place blanket preemption of
punitive damages claims with respect to both drugs and medical devices in state and federal
courts, with fraud-on-the-FDA and bribery exceptions. Id. § 201(f)(1)(B). Moreover, even
where punitive damages are permitted, they would be limited to the greater of three times the
amount of damages awarded to the claimant for economic loss, or $250,000. Id. § 201(b).
In addition to a bar or cap on punitive damages, the proposed legislation also would include a
total cap of $250,000 on noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress,
in all civil actions against a "manufacturer, distributor, supplier, marketer, promoter, or seller of
a medical product"-which includes drugs and devices-regardless of the number of separate
claims brought or number of parties against whom they are brought. Id. §§ 203(a), (c)(3). These
limitations, as with those respecting punitive damages, would apply to both federal and state
court actions. Id. § 203(b).
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preemption in the medical device context are applicable to
pharmaceuticals. 199
It is likely, however, that a legislative effort to obtain a provision
like § 360k for pharmaceuticals would be met by efforts of the plain-
tiff's bar to implement some mechanism for providing compensation
to injured parties. A plausible compromise would be a legislative
package similar to the National Childhood Vaccination Injury Act,
perhaps with additional refinements. As discussed above, the NCVI
Act established a fund financed by the federal government that pro-
vides no-fault compensation to victims of vaccinations, thereby ensur-
ing that no victims of vaccine-caused injuries are uncompensated.200
While those injured by vaccines still have access to the courts under
the NCVI Act, no tort recovery can be had with respect to unavoida-
ble injuries and deaths and no punitive damages are available with
respect to avoidable injuries and deaths if a manufacturer has com-
plied in all material respects with FDC Act requirements. 201
There may be similar Congressional support for a no-fault compen-
sation fund for those injured by pharmaceutical products and that pro-
tects manufacturers that have complied with FDC Act requirements
from liability. Driving adoption of the NCVI Act was a fear that com-
panies were ceasing production of vaccines, and that this was a grave
threat to national health.20 2 As with vaccines, pharmaceuticals also
save "[b]illions of medical and health-related dollars" and have "pre-
vented thousands of" deaths. 20 3 And, as with vaccines, massive state
tort litigation has driven off the market some prescription drugs
deemed safe and effective by the FDA and, in all likelihood, deterred
199. See H.R. REP. No. 853, supra note 11, at 45 ("The Committee recognizes that if a sub-
stantial number of differing requirements applicable to a medical device are imposed by jurisdic-
tions other than the Federal government, interstate commerce would be unduly burdened.").
200. See supra note 187 and accompanying text (discussing compensation for victims of
vaccinations).
201. See 42 U.S.C. § 300-aa-22(b)(1) (stating no liability for unavoidable deaths); see also
§ 300aa-23(d)(2) (providing no punitive damages except in a few narrow circumstances). Pend-
ing legislation before the Congress similarly would shield manufacturers that have followed FDA
requirements from punitive damages. See supra note 204 (discussing pending litigation).
202. See H.R. RaP. No. 908, supra note 68, at 4, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6344, 6345
(noting "a real concern about the future of Federal immunization initiatives" that are "[a]t least
in part as a result of [an] increase in litigation," as a result of which "the prices of vaccines have
jumped enormously [and t]he number of childhood vaccine manufacturers has declined
significantly").
203. Id.; see Brozen, supra note 98, at 305 ("[D]rugs are our most cost-effective input in sup-
plying the demand for health. A ten-dollar prescription is frequently a substitute for $2,000
worth of hospital services-a substitute that produces a positive outcome with much higher fre-
quency than hospital care").
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researchers from developing pharmaceuticals in intrinsically high-risk
medical fields such as pregnancy.2 4
Were Congressional enthusiasm found to be only minimal for such
a legislative scheme, Congressional support might materialize for a
legislative regime under which the compensation fund was funded by
the pharmaceutical industry itself. Such a statute still could be of ben-
efit to the pharmaceutical industry by making its costs more predict-
able, sharply limiting litigation costs and eliminating punitive
damages.
2. Various State Legislative Options
A final non-judicial option for achieving the public health aims of
the FDC Act would be to pursue comparable legislative remedies at
the state level. A number of states already have enacted legislation
according conclusive, or at least partial, effect to FDA approval of a
drug. For example, a recent New Jersey statute provides absolute im-
munity with respect to failure-to-warn claims where the FDA has ap-
proved a label and the manufacturer has not unlawfully kept
information from the FDA,20 5 and affords manufacturers immunity
against punitive damages if there was either FDA pre-marketing ap-
proval or if the product was recognized as "safe and effective" under
applicable FDA conditions and regulations. At least one other state
has adopted similar statutory provisions.20 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress turned its attention in 1976 to the question of whether
state laws relating to medical devices are preempted by the FDC Act.
It answered in the affirmative by noting that without preemption in-
terstate commerce would be unduly burdened, enacting an explicit
preemption provision. Under this provision, a broad and growing ju-
risprudence of preemption relating to medical devices has been devel-
oped by the courts whose contours stretch so far as to bar suits where
companies have withheld information from the FDA.
204. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d at 479-80 (noting the withdrawal of Bendectin,
the anti-nauseant drug for women).
205. See N.J.STAT. ANN. § 2A:58(c-5) (Supp. 1995) (providing that punitive damages not
awarded if the drug was subject to pre-market approval by the FDA).
206. See, e.g., UTAH CODE ArN. § 78-18-2 (1992) (stating punitive damages unavailable if
drug approved by FDA or generally recognized as safe and effective under FDA guidelines);
UTAH CODE ANr. § 78-15-6(3) (1992) (creating rebuttable presumption that product was not
defective if manufactured according to applicable government standards).
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Although the identical policy concerns are applicable to prescrip-
tion drugs, courts have been far more reluctant to find preemption in
this context. This has been a mistake, but one which the courts may
be willing to revisit in light of the developing medical device case law
and the analytical flaws in the pharmaceutical case law itself. Upon a
considered analysis, state law should be found to be preempted be-
cause the comprehensive federal regulatory scheme governing pre-
scription drugs fully occupies the field of drug safety regulation.
Alternatively, state tort and contract claims should be preempted at
least where they actually conflict with the FDC Act.
Many courts have recognized these concerns but have refused to
find preemption on the basis of certain presumptions against preemp-
tion. Further examination, however, reveals that many of these pre-
sumptions are not even applicable to pharmaceutical drugs. Other
courts have erroneously imported preemption decisions in the vaccine
context - where there is an explicit statutory provision making state
law applicable - into the pharmaceutical context, where there is no
provision indicating that state law is still applicable. When the inap-
posite presumptions and vaccine cases are set aside, it becomes clear
that most jurisdictions have no governing law on the question of
whether or not state law relating to prescription drugs is preempted
under the FDC Act. The question is thus fully open for judicial
determination.
Further, there are several little-pursued alternatives to preemption
in the pharmaceutical area that may be able to achieve nearly all of
the vital public policy objectives embodied in the FDC Act. Courts
could find that, as a matter of federal common law, adherence to FDA
standards conclusively proves that companies have lived up to their
obligations under state tort (and warranty) law. Alternatively, state
courts could follow the path set by California and several other states
and find, as a matter of state law, that fidelity to FDA standards satis-
fies companies' legal duties.
A final way to realize the public health goals pursued by Congres-
sional enactment of the FDC Act is through additional legislation.
Congress could adopt an explicit preemption provision, similar to 21
U.S. Code § 360k in the medical device arena, that applies to pharma-
ceutical products. Indeed, Congress currently is considering legisla-
tion that at least protects companies producing drugs and devices
under FDA approval from punitive damages. Another option is that
Congress could adopt a legislative scheme akin to the NCVI Act that
establishes a compensation fund for those injured by drugs but largely
shields companies that have abided by FDA requirements from tort
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liability. Lastly, individual state legislatures could follow in the steps
of New Jersey and Utah and enact legislation protecting companies
that have followed FDA requirements from tort liability in their
states.
In short, there remain many active legal options for eliminating the
illogical distinction as regards preemption between medical devices
and pharmaceuticals. The common denominator of all of those ap-
proaches to rationalizing the law governing drugs and devices is that
they seek to ensure that companies are subject to a single set of re-
quirements formulated by the FDA's experts processes. It is those
processes, and not the individualized post-hoc judgments of lay judges
and juries, that are best calculated to determine what availability of,
and warnings concerning, drugs optimize public health.
